柳叶刀

A |     在韩国历史上，有很多总统无一幸免都遭受下台或者被迫退休后的人生陨落，但是文在寅成为韩国总统中的第一个也是唯一一个能够全身而退的人。在卸任之后，回归到乡村，完全过上了一种无政治压力的田园生活，那么这样做不仅能够让自己摆脱权力带来的任何负担，同时也能展示出自己是多么的远离权力。视频加载中...但是这样的选择并不简单，因为韩国的“青瓦台魔咒”已经陪伴韩国几十年。    

    China Coast Guard vessel 3303 deploys water cannons on July 24, 2026, against Philippine public vessel MMOV 3001, which had intruded into China's Huangyan Dao waters, forcing the vessel to turn around and sail away from Huangyan Dao. Photo: Courtesy of China Coast Guard
Cloaked in the academic mantle of a Stanford‑affiliated "think‑tank" but operated by retired US military officers; dispatching no warships but endlessly churning out provocation scripts in the South China Sea, and shifting from choreographing footage of maritime stand‑offs to meddling in legitimate China‑Philippine cultural and academic exchanges, the SeaLight has loomed behind numerous China‑Philippine maritime frictions over the past years.
The true nature of the SeaLight, once stripped of disguise, is a well‑orchestrated cognitive‑war tool targeting China. It delivers strategies, provides talking points, furnishes intelligence and cultivates proxies, weaponizing both maritime confrontations and people‑to‑people exchanges to deliberately stir up tensions in the South China Sea.
A cognitive‑war platform

Public information indicates that SeaLight is affiliated with Stanford University's Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, established in 2021 with sponsorship from the US Office of Naval Research and funding from the US Department of Defense. The funding sources amounted to approximately $12.8 million.
Public records indicate that SeaLight's "director" Ray Powell served 35 years in the US Air Force, including posts in the Philippines, Japan, Germany, and Qatar. In 2022, following his departure from overseas service, he launched "Project Myoushu," which evolved into "SeaLight" in 2023. 
When Global Times reporter browsed SeaLight's website, multiple unprofessional features of this self‑proclaimed "think‑tank" came to light. Aside from its "director" Powell, the team counts merely three other members, one of whom is a web developer.
Even so, this same "think tank" smeared China's lawful actions to safeguard sovereignty in the South China Sea on its website as the world's "most expansive and aggressive maritime gray‑zone programs."
In February this year, Guo Wei, Deputy Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Manila, wrote in an X post that as a US-based organization, SeaLight maintains "an unusually concentrated focus on the South China Sea." It has reacted to maritime developments with remarkable speed, at times even preceding official statements from Philippine authorities.
"Why does SeaLight concentrate so heavily on this specific region? Through what channels does a US-based entity obtain rapid access to satellite imagery and operational information located thousands of kilometers away?" Guo asked. 
A Manila‑based source told the Global Times on Friday that SeaLight maintains close‑knit, in‑depth coordination with the Philippine Coast Guard. The two sides sustain long‑term information exchange and intelligence‑sharing, forming a collaborative model through which the Philippines provokes maritime incidents at sea, SeaLight assigns public‑narrative framing, and social media platforms amplify the hype, to stage targeted cognitive‑war games against China.
Billed as a research institute, SeaLight is essentially a China‑targeting cognitive‑war platform centered on a small group of individuals, supplying the Philippines with policy advice, intelligence inputs and public‑narration talking points, Chen Xiangmiao, a research fellow at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, told the Global Times on Friday. 
In addition, it serves as a megaphone for the Philippines, churning out disinformation across social‑media platforms to viciously smear China and fabricate the "China threat" narrative, courting international attention in a deliberate bid to stoke regional tensions, Chen added. 
"An ex-US Air Force colonel is now running the show in Philippine foreign relations," Rod Kapunan, a columnist for the Philippines' daily newspaper The Standard, wrote in his article in 2024. He further described Powell as the author of the "transparency strategy," which Philippine officials took as "Philippine policy."
"SeaLight hides its main objective, which is to apply the 'missing context fallacy' to create an anti-China narrative out of the South China Sea territorial claims disputes amongst the five littoral states surrounding the strategically critical body of water," Kapunan said in the article. 
"Still, its China‑focused cognitive warfare yields diminishing marginal returns," said Chen, "Repeated lies fail to convince the public. For this reason, it keeps hunting for new material for attacks, yet it can never create any major ripples."
Back in September 2024, an article in The Diplomat titled "The Philippines Should Take Note: 'Assertive Transparency' Is Not a Strategy" noted that it was in 2023, "spurred on by the likes Raymond Powell and the folks at Project Myoushu, that the Philippines began publicizing maritime incidents in the South China Sea." However, what Philippine authorities need to understand is that "assertive transparency" has reached its saturation point.
The second battlefield

For a long period, SeaLight fought its main battles on South China Sea waters, guiding the Philippines to hype stand‑offs and fabricate the false "China bullying the Philippines" narrative. Lately, however, it has shifted its battlefield, targeting normal China‑Philippine cultural and academic people‑to‑people exchanges.
Last month, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. called for greater scrutiny of foreign academic and cultural exchange programs with China, in response to a SeaLight report that claimed China's Jinan University has become the main broker between China's institutions and Chinese-language schools in the Philippines.  
This incident directly forced the cancellation of a three‑week‑long field research trip to the Philippines scheduled for August 4 by Dai Fan, Director of the Center for Philippine Studies at Jinan University.
Dai told the Global Times on Friday that this incident lays bare the fact that SeaLight is by no means a rigorous, neutral academic‑research platform. Instead, it follows a propaganda playbook where conclusions come first and evidence is cobbled together afterwards.
Nevertheless, this simplistic and heavy‑handed narrative is highly deceptive and manipulative in the public opinion arena. It can easily mislead the Philippine public and foster one‑sided perceptions, Dai added. 
In an X post on August 2, the Chinese Embassy in Manila further pointed out that the incident marks Ray Powell's "second battlefield" against China, from maritime disputes to civil society. 
"His broader objective appears clear: to encourage the Philippines to view nearly every interaction with China through the lens of strategic confrontation, gradually transforming the country into a frontline state in Washington's competition with Beijing. The ultimate goal is to systematically turn the Philippines into a 'proxy battlefield' for containing China," reads the embassy's X post. 
The latest report released by SeaLight was immediately echoed by Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro, underscoring the close collusion between the two sides, Chen noted.
Based on long‑term observations by a Global Times source based in the Philippines, SeaLight, the Philippine Coast Guard and pro‑US, anti‑China hard‑line forces in the country have forged an interconnected chain. They have long sought to push for amendments and upgrades to the Philippines' anti‑espionage law and advance legislation for the so‑called "proxy bill," aiming to establish a systematic, institutionalized anti‑China mechanism.
According to Chen, there is a strong likelihood that Philippine authorities provide financial backing for SeaLight's China‑focused cognitive‑war operations. Meanwhile, Powell and SeaLight have become a key instrument for the Philippine military to secure budget appropriations from Congress.
This strategy creates a sinister closed‑interest loop: stoking maritime frictions, whipping up domestic public sentiment, and pressuring Congress to divert livelihood‑related budgets to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). The tenser the maritime situation, the more resources flow to the PCG. By contrast, calm seas strip the force of its rationale for expansion, Chen said. 
According to Chen, this opportunistic hype‑driven model adopted by the Philippine side in collusion with SeaLight will ultimately backfire. The South China Sea disputes could have been managed through dialogue to share marine and fishery resources and deliver mutually beneficial outcomes. However, SeaLight keeps stoking conflicts and amplifying divisions, severely undermining the Philippines' environment for peaceful development, at the expense of the Filipino people's vital interests.
Regional countries ought to see through the true nature of such external "think‑tank" projects. They should recognize the harm these entities inflict on regional well‑being, peace and stability by artificially orchestrating public opinion storms over the South China Sea, said Chen.
The Philippines' ill-judged farce of provoking China will sooner or later end in tragedy for itself, Chen warned. 
。文在寅又是如何打破这个魔咒的呢?即使现在卸任，他的退休金也高达1400万韩元，一月1700万韩元，这对于退休后的老人来说着实不小，但是对于他来说，仅仅是退休金应该绰绰有余。

B | 那么，这笔钱足够他过上舒舒服服的生活，但是文在寅没有这么做，他选择将自己的书店开设到离青瓦台比较近的地方。这样的行为非常鲜明，既可以和民众亲密接触，也可以方便别人就找上门来，询问总统大事，还可以加强你自己看似淡泊名利的品格。文在寅与民众良好的关系。文在寅可以说与民众之间并没有什么较大的距离感，但是本文之所以有如此好的成绩，可以说是与他的为民政策息息相关的。必须承认的是，在担任总统期间能够做出如此成就的总统并不很多，而且不仅仅是因为他有这样的能力，还因为有这样强大的推力。

C | 文在寅虽然没有“碾压性的政策”来进行民众舆论上的引导，但是通过多个方面，不断进行一些小的惠民政策，这些政策逐渐累积上起来，就制造了巨大的推力，最终能够让文在寅获得阶段性的巨大成功。

D | 在文在寅入主青瓦台之前，最早是从其他党派中脱离出来，成立新政府，并且文在寅本人就是一个大好人，尤其是在进行对北关系中的一些问题处理时，更显得如此。不仅不会对北方进行强硬的打击，同时也不会用谴责的口吻进行其他方面问题上的影射。正因为这样的一款大好人形象，在北方获得了很好的评价，这也促进了随后两个国家之间关系更加紧密。就拿这件事来说，不会对他造成威胁，但是也有其他方面能够威胁到他。他在作出了一系列惠民政策之后，得到了超高的民众支持度，即使有一些反对他的人，也逐渐被他所感动，变成支持队伍中的一员。这一系列惠民政策不仅包括大的方面，还有一些很小的细节方面都涉及到了。在他的规划中，对于青年人的资助，其规定是满足毕业生的租房需求，在其政府执政期间，推出了一系列为青年人群提供住房租金补贴措施，并且还为生育女性提供加强产假时间期限和产假工资比例等政策。

E | 这些一系列接一系列的小举措，可以说如果换成其他人来执行，这些政策都会慢慢改进，但是文在寅并没有，他能够使这些处于民主政策中来，一步一步积累起来，让文在寅得到超高支持度。

F | 特别是在青瓦台那个魔咒笼罩下时，他还能够将这些小举措不断进行累积，而这样的成果就已经足以赚得他的连任。“青瓦台魔咒”的破除。文在寅能够成为第一人，说明他的确有这个能力，在韩国几十年历史中，虽然民众都受到不同程度上的折磨，但是当时他们就需要一个能够真正为他们考虑的人。

G | 就是他将这些方面重点突出，直接落实到生活的每一个细节中，这样民众的使用才会更加方便，这对他们来说就是最好的。随着时间的推移，他们对文在寅也是越来越信任，这样一步一步，他们已经不能接受其他人的施政了。所以当时有传言说，韩国要重新选举一次，他都没有这么做，因为他的支持度已经足够连任。并且从这个过程来看，其实它已经打破了韩国“青瓦台”魔咒，但是后来还是被人搶走。

H | 后来他被人抢去之后，就开始讨论他的一些动作，以及和民众之间的一切交往。这时，就有人提出:“其实很多人都是喜欢跟他照相的，他和别人照相的时候非常兴高采烈，但是自己不愿意却又能合理避开，不让别人瞎拍。这些行为都是很自私自利的表现，只不过被他的粉丝进行神化罢了。”但是也有另外一方认为:“如果这样的话，那周围加上保镖都是些什么行为。”于是就有这样一种说法称:“你的行为是否足够透明，将直接影响你的信任度。”实际上无论是哪一派意见，都无法改变一个东西，那就是文在寅已经积累了超高的民众支持度，即使是“青瓦台魔咒”，也为自己暂时解锁，而当时他失去了再次当选机会，本身就是等待着接下来的行动。所以，即使他的行动存在一定的讨好行为，但我们忽略不计的话，也是均可行通的，即使不是100%透明，也绝对靠谱吗。文所在行通。因为如果想当选，就要照顾到每一个人的感受，毕竟要打破“青瓦台魔咒”，有了这么高的支持要求，那么就更希望你能做到尽善尽美。甚至对于一些小一区的地方，也要将它规划成社区医院，所以，当时你就要完美到无可挑剔，用现在来说，就是零缺陷，那么还可能会有人说这是谦虚吗?不得不说，他们之间的是矛盾，首先是不完整，但还要非黑即白，其次是透明，但透明也有透明的方法，所以要想通，就要理智一定要平衡。但是，不管怎样，他们都无法阻挡文在寅与民众之间建立的巨大环境，这是无可厚非的，也成为他退位后最大的安全卫士。文在寅在这个过程中，虽然还有一些小动作，但必然不能动摇如今的大局，只是当时是不是那么透明，也就无所谓了。我们也许不能给这样的行为进行判断，但是对于他们来说，他们只想拥有那种好感，如果缺乏这种东西，他们又回到了原来的位置。